

REMARKS

The present application was filed on October 31, 2003 with claims 1-20. Claims 2-4 and 8-20 have been canceled without prejudice. Claims 1 and 5-7 remain pending, with claim 1 the only pending independent claim.

Claims 1 and 5-7 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. §103(a) as being unpatentable over U.S. Patent No. 6,971,107 (hereinafter “Sjostrom”) in view of U.S. Patent No. 6,253,022 (hereinafter “Hobbs”).

Claim 1 includes a limitation directed to preventing a user from interacting with the first frame until after the second frame is sufficiently loaded, said prevention occurring after a determination is made that the first frame depends on the second frame, otherwise, permitting the user to interact with the first frame regardless of whether the second frame is sufficiently loaded. Claim 1 further specifies that the first frame is displayed until after the second frame is sufficiently loaded regardless of whether the user is permitted to interact with the first frame.

In formulating the present rejection, the Examiner argues that Sjostrom fails to teach the limitations of claim 1 directed to preventing a user from interacting with the first frame until after the second frame is sufficiently loaded after a determination is made that the first frame depends on the second frame. Rather, the Examiner relies on column 31, lines 1-20, of Hobbs, which the Examiner characterizes as disclosing “the use of modal windows (frame) which prevents the user from interacting with an underlying application window (frame). The user must wait to interact with the application window until the modal frame is loaded and closed through user interaction.” (internal citations omitted) Even assuming that the use of a modal window taught by Hobbs could be characterized as preventing a user from interacting with a first frame until after a second frame is sufficiently loaded, Applicants note that the relied-upon portion of Hobbs in fact teaches away from such a technique:

The window is a semi-modal window, controlled and managed either by the embedded application or the scripted language, or by both. Semi-modal means that it has some characteristics of a modal window (it does not close automatically if one clicks in its background as typical pop-up windows do); yet unlike a modal window, it does not prevent activity in the background from taking place. For example,

making a modal window appear in front of an applet would cause any buttons generated by the applet and appearing to the side of the window to freeze until the modal window is closed. In contrast, the semi-modal window permits buttons to be pressed in its background without causing it to close.

In other words, Hobbs suggests the desirability of a semi-modal window which “unlike a modal window, … does not prevent activity in the background from taking place.” As such, Hobbs teaches directly away from the limitation at issue in which a user is prevented from interacting with the first frame until after the second frame is sufficiently loaded.

Moreover, even assuming that Sjostrom could be characterized as teaching a technique in which a user is permitted to interact with the first frame regardless of whether the second frame is sufficiently loaded and that Hobbs could be characterized as teaching a technique in which a user is prevented from interacting with the first frame until after the second frame is sufficiently loaded, such teachings would nonetheless fail to meet the limitations of claim 1.

Specifically, as noted above, claim 1 recites a specific arrangement in which, after a determination is made that the first frame depends on the second frame, a user is prevented from interacting with the first frame until after the second frame is sufficiently loaded. Otherwise, i.e., if such a determination is not made, the user is permitted to interact with the first frame regardless of whether the second frame is sufficiently loaded.

Applicants respectfully submit that Sjostrom and Hobbs contain no teaching or suggestion directed to determining whether a first frame depends on the second frame, much less preventing or permitting user interaction with the first frame based on such a determination, as recited on claim 1. Indeed, both references teach away by instead disclosing techniques in which user interaction with a frame is entirely unrelated to whether that frame depends on another frame.

As recently noted by the Supreme Court, “a patent composed of several elements is not proved obvious merely by demonstrating that each of its elements was, independently, known in the prior art.” *KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc.*, 127 SCt 1727, 1741, 82 USPQ2d 1385, 1396 (U.S. 2007) Indeed, “when the prior art teaches away from combining certain known elements, discovery

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
of a successful means of combining them is more likely to be nonobvious.” *Id.*, 127 SCt at 1740, 82 USPQ2d at 1395 (citing *United States v. Adams*, 383 U.S. 39, 51-52, 148 USPQ 479, 484 (1966)).

Applicants respectfully submit that the combination of Sjostrom and Hobbs fails to render claim 1 obvious.

Dependent claims 5-7 are allowable for at least the reasons identified above with regard to claim 1. One or more of these claims are also believed to define separately-patentable subject matter over the cited art.

In view of the above, Applicants believe that claims 1 and 5-7 are in condition for allowance, and respectfully request withdrawal of the §103(a) rejection.

Respectfully submitted,



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Date: December 23, 2008